This paper investigates the hypothesis that markets favor traders with more accurate beliefs. Unlike existing results, notably Sandroni (2000) and Blume-Easley (2006) , I propose an approach that (i) is directly informative about equilibrium prices, (ii) provides a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient for the wealth-share of a trader to converge to zero, and (iii) can be applied to both small and large economies. My analysis reveals that these two settings are qualitatively different. In small economies, irrespective of traders' risk attitudes, markets select for traders with more accurate beliefs. In large economies, risk attitudes can play a determinant role on the survival of a trader: there are cases in which the wealth-share of a group of traders with rational expectations converges to zero even if no other trader in the economy has correct beliefs.
Introduction
According to the market selection hypothesis, henceforth MSH, the market selects for the traders with the most accurate beliefs. This hypothesis, first articulated by Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) , is one of the key arguments in support of rational expectations: as the wealth-share of traders with correct beliefs converges to one, financial markets can be understood, to a large extent, using models with a representative trader with correct beliefs, i.e. rational expectations.
The validity of the MSH has been studied extensively in various, general settings. In partial equilibrium models (De Long et al (1990 ,1991 , and and in general equilibrium models with exogenous saving decisions (Blume-Easley 1992) , it has been shown that different risk attitudes can affect the validity of the MSH because risk-averse agents with incorrect beliefs may have higher capital accumulation rate than agents with correct beliefs. Conversely, in general equilibrium models with finitely many traders and bounded aggregate endowment, henceforth small economies, Sandroni (2000) and Blume-Easley (2006) propose sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for a trader to vanish based on the pairwise comparison of traders' discounted beliefs. These conditions do not depend on equilibrium prices and, if all traders have the same discount factor, imply that a trader with rational expectations survives almost surely. This paper puts to task the proposed irrelevance of equilibrium prices in the selection mechanism. Instead of focusing on the comparison of traders' discounted beliefs, I characterize equilibrium prices and use them to study the asymptotic fate of each trader directly from the individual first order conditions (FOCs). This approach delivers a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient for a trader to vanish and that can be used to extend the analysis to economies populated by a continuum of traders, henceforth large economies. My analysis shows that, even for small-homogenous-discountfactor-economies, a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient for a trader to vanish must depend on equilibrium prices. The reason is that equilibrium prices reflect the discounted beliefs of all of the traders at once and, as intuition suggests, it is harder to "beat" many traders simultaneously than to "beat" each trader in a pairwise comparison. Moreover, my analysis shows that small economies and large economies are qualitatively different. In small economies, risk attitudes play no role in survival because their effect on equilibrium prices is asymptotically negligible, whereas in large economies, because their effect on equilibrium prices is asymptotically relevant, risk attitudes do play a role in survival and the MSH can fail.
There are two main reasons to focus on large economies. The first reason is to justify the competitiveness of Walrasian equilibrium (Aumann (1965) ). Second, large economies provide a closer description of certain characteristics of real world markets. The driving force of the selection mechanism in small economies is the statistical property that, if we have a finite set of beliefs and an infinite sequence of realizations (traders live forever), we are able to uniquely identify the most accurate trader. Nevertheless, real world markets are populated by many traders that, with similar investment strategies, maintain similar wealth-shares. This observation suggests that the number of trading periods is typically not large enough to uniquely identify the trader with the best investment strategy. The large economy setting is a modeling choice that allows for the derivation of results on the effect of risk attitudes on prices and on wealthshares that are probabilistically sharp (almost sure, or in every path), maintaining the property that, even asymptotically, a unique most accurate trader cannot be identified.
Equilibrium prices
The key step to my approach is to provide a characterization of prices that is general enough to cover a wide spectrum of economies and informative enough to derive meaningful results. The information structure adopted is standard in the market selection literature and is a key component of the model. Each trader has a personal probabilistic view of the world, his beliefs. Unlike models in the information exchange literature (Grossmann-Stiglitz 1980) , traders believe that there is nothing to be learn from prices and are engaged in speculative trading.
My characterization of equilibrium prices exploits the similarities between equilibrium prices and discounted probabilities. For intuition, consider the time 0 prices of Arrow's securities in an economy with no aggregate risk and homogeneous discount fac-tors. For the degenerate case of a representative agent economy, it is an easy exercise to show that the price of a contingent claim on a certain period-state coincides with the discounted probability of that period-state. In log-economies, equilibrium prices are convex combinations of traders' discounted beliefs (Rubinstein (1974) ). It follows that next period equilibrium price evolution coincides with Bayesian updating (see the leading example or Blume-Easley (2009) ).
The analysis of non-log-economies is complicated by the fact that, in small samples, prices are not discounted probabilities: the sum of equilibrium prices differs from the common discount factor (Jouini-Napp (2006) , Cvitanic-Jouini et al. (2012) ). Standard economic arguments imply that the effect of risk attitudes on equilibrium prices vanishes as the wealth-share of the trader with most accurate beliefs converges to one. In small economies, wealth-shares move fast. Hence, risk attitudes have no asymptotic effect on equilibrium prices, which are asymptotically equivalent to a convex combination of traders' discounted beliefs. In large economies, wealth-shares move slower. Hence, risk attitudes can have an asymptotic effect on equilibrium prices. Theorem 2 precisely quantifies this effect and shows that equilibrium prices can fail to be asymptotically equivalent to a convex combination of traders' discounted beliefs.
Small Economies
In small economies, different risk attitudes have no qualitative effect on asymptotic prices. If all of the traders have the same discount factor, my characterization confirms the long-standing conjecture of Blume-Easley (1993 , 2009 ) that equilibrium prices evolve in a way that is qualitatively Bayesian. The initial wealth distribution plays the role of a prior distribution on the different beliefs, henceforth market prior. For homogeneous-discount-factor-small-economies, my characterization leads to the following result: a trader vanishes if and only if his beliefs are, in terms of likelihood, less accurate than the probability obtained via Bayes' rule from the market prior. This necessary and sufficient condition is qualitatively different from the existing results (Sandroni (2000) , Blume-Easley (2006 ), Yan (2008 , Kogan-Ross et a. (2006) that read as follows: a trader vanishes if there is another trader with more accurate be-liefs. The intuition is that it is harder to "beat" many traders simultaneously than to "beat" each trader in a pairwise comparison. In Section 5.2.1, I provide an example of a homogeneous discount factor economy in which the necessary part of my condition identifies a trader who vanishes that could not be identified using the pairwise comparison approach. This observation is consistent with Blume-Easley's (2009) finding for iid economies with heterogeneous discount factors.
Large Economies
In large economies, risk attitudes have an effect on the asymptotic value of equilibrium prices and, hence, on survival. In a large economy populated by traders with identical CRRA utility functions, equilibrium prices are not probabilities and the asymptotic effect of risk attitudes on equilibrium prices and wealth-share movements can be strong enough to negate the MSH.
The differences between small and large economies can be exemplified as follows.
Consider an economy that contains a group of traders with heterogeneous iid beliefs and a group of Bayesian traders whose prior support coincides with the union of the beliefs of the iid traders. All of the traders have identical CRRA utility functions and discount factors. The fate of the group of Bayesian traders depends on the size of the economy and on risk attitudes as follows: if the economy is small, irrespective of risk attitudes, the group of Bayesian traders survives in every path (by Corollary 1); if the economy is large and the traders are less (more) risk averse than log, the group of Bayesian traders vanishes (dominates 1 ) in every path (by Proposition 2).
For an intuition, let's focus on the case in which all traders in the economy are less risk averse than log. By Proposition 1, i) a negative interest rate is endogenously generated, making it harder for the Bayesian traders to survive; ii) the wealth-share of the traders with iid beliefs that correspond to (if the economy is large, in a shrinking interval around) the realized frequency grows faster than it would in a log-economy, making it more profitable to be lucky. These forces are present in both settings but are negligible in small economies (by Theorem 1) and substantial in large economies 1 A trader dominates if its wealth-share converges to 1.
(by Theorem 2).
The example can be used to show that the MSH does not hold in large economies: if we assume that the true probability coincides with the beliefs of the Bayesian traders 2 , the Bayesian traders have rational expectations, yet they vanish (see Section 5.4).
Importantly, even if the Bayesian traders have rational expectations and vanish, the selection argument still supports a version of convergence to rational expectations:
the Bayesian traders lose their wealth-share to an ever-shrinking interval (in the beliefs space) of traders around the iid model whose parameter coincides with the realized asymptotic frequency (which is a random variable). On the realized path, this model produces forecasts that are asymptotically equivalent to the probabilities obtained using the true data generating process. Hence, by selecting for the lucky traders around the realized frequency, the market is selecting a model that is asymptotically as good as the true one. In Section 5.4 I introduce the notion of exchangeable models and show that this result is an implication of De Finetti's Theorem.
The qualitative difference between small and large economies can be puzzling. In Appendix D I identify and discuss two possible discontinuities between these settings: a discontinuity due to the effect of risk attitudes on survival and a statistical discontinuity. These discontinuity have a natural explanation. The first discontinuity is generated by the dichotomic definition of survival, it disappears if we focus on asymptotic wealth-shares; the statistical discontinuity only appears at infinitum, hence it does not affect the significance of my analysis on arbitrarily long, but finite sequences.
Moreover, the statistical discontinuity disappears if we chose an appropriate way to construct the limit economy.
The model
The model is an infinite horizon Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with complete markets. Time is discrete and begins at date 0. At each date there is a finite set of states S ≡ {1, ..., S} with cardinality |S|=S. The set of all infinite sequences of states is S ∞ with representative sequence of realizations σ = (σ 1 , ...). Let σ t = (σ 1 , ..., σ t ) denote the partial history through date t of path σ, S t be the set containing all of the different sequences of length t and let Σ t be the algebra that consists of all the finite unions of sequences of length t. Σ is the smallest σ-algebra on ∪ ∞ t=1 Σ t . Let P be the true probability measure on Σ. For any probability measure p on Σ, p(σ t ) is the marginal probability of the partial history σ t ; that is,
The information set at time t is F t . For simplicity, I assume that traders can only learn from past realizations: F t ≡ σ t . The conditional probability of σ t , given the information set F t−1 can therefore be defined as p(σ|F t−1 ) = p(σ|σ t−1 ) =
. The expectation operator written without a subscript is the expectation with respect to the true measure P .
The economy contains a set of traders I. Each trader, i, has consumption set R + . A consumption plan c :
in which each c t (σ) is F t -measurable. Each trader i is endowed with a particular consumption plan, called the endowment stream and denoted by e i t (σ). Each trader i is characterized by a payoff function u i : R + → [−∞, +∞] over consumption, a discount factor β i ∈ (0, 1) and a subjective probability p i on Σ, his beliefs. There are almost no restrictions on the true probability, nor on the way traders' beliefs evolve.
The only requirement is that the traders' beliefs define a probability on Σ. Trader i's utility for a consumption plan c is:
In terms of asymptotic wealth-shares, traders can either vanish or survive: Definition 1. Trader i vanishes on path σ if lim t→∞ c t (σ) = 0. He survives on path
Most of the results of the paper are derived using the time 0 trading setting. Formally, the price of a claim that pays a unit of consumption at the end of σ t in terms of consumption at time 0 is given by q(σ t ). Nevertheless, in order to discuss price dynamics, I use the known equivalence between time 0 trading and sequential trad-ing (see Ljungqvist-Sargent (2004, ch.8) ). In equilibrium, the price of an Arrow's security that pays a unit of consumption in state σ, period t, after history σ t−1 is
. Which, given Assumption 3, is always well-defined.
Beliefs' Accuracy
I rank beliefs' accuracy according to a standard statistical criterion of accuracy: the likelihood ratio test.
Definition 2. Given a true probability measure P, trader i's beliefs, p i , are more accurate than trader j's if P {σ ∈ Σ :
This definition, unlike the one adopted by Sandroni (2000) and Blume-Easley (2006) , does not use any approximation of the likelihoods of traders' beliefs. There are two reasons for this departure. First, Sandroni's definition can be too coarse to discuss survival (for example, when there are two Bayesian traders with nested priors).
Second, there are cases in which Blume-Easley's definition leads to incorrect results (see Massari (2013) or the example in Section 5.2.1).
Next, I present a known result about Bayesian accuracy that will be used to construct the comparison between the Bayesian procedure and equilibrium prices in large economies: the BIC approximation (Schwarz (1978) , Clarke-Barron (1990) , PhillipsPloberger(2003) , Grünwald (2007) ). The result captures the intuitive idea that there is a cost, in terms of likelihood, in using models with redundant parameters. More parameters correspond to slower convergence to the best model in the prior support, hence, a lower likelihood.
BIC approximation. Given a Bayesian model p B with a smooth prior on a kdimensional non-empty open strict subset of the parameter space of an exponential
Where pî (σ t ) is the parameter choice with the highest likelihood on σ t .
Moreover, if P ∈ M, then pî (σ t ) → P -a.s. P.
It is important to stress the generality of the result. 
The Leading Example
This example illustrates the main features of my approach and compares it with the existing one. Consider an Arrow's security economy with S states with iid multinomial distribution P and no aggregate risk. There are I traders with log utility, identical discount factors (β), iid beliefs p i and positive Pareto weight (
There is a trader with correct beliefs. The solution is interior and the FOC is:
My approach:
The first step is to characterize equilibrium prices.
In this simple economy, equilibrium prices can be obtained explicitly:
which is the probability that a Bayesian with prior distribution W 0 = {w 0 (1), ..., w 0 (I)} on P = {p 1 , ..., p I } would attach to σ t .
Moreover, next period price evolution coincides with discounted Bayesian updating:
The second step is to use equilibrium prices to discuss survival.
Substituting the price equation in the FOC: The existing approaches focus on the pairwise comparison of the accuracy of traders discounted beliefs, using the true probability as a reference model. They approach selection by focusing on the log ratios of the FOCs of different traders:
trader j vanishes P -a.s. if there is another trader with more accurate beliefs.
The example highlights that my approach is more informative, less demanding and more precise than the existing one. It is more informative because allows to characterize equilibrium price dynamics. It is less demanding because I do not need to explicitly use the true probability in my condition, which is likely to be unknown in practice. And it is more precise because my condition is necessary as well as sufficient for a trader to vanish. In the example, there is a unique most accurate trader, hence p q → P a.s. P and the two approaches are asymptotically equivalent. Nevertheless, if equilibrium prices do not converge, the two conditions can differ as shown in Section 5.2.1.
The drawback of my condition is that I must be able to provide a characterization of equilibrium prices that is general enough to be applied to generic economies and specific enough to derive precise results. The main theme of the paper is to generalize the example to the case of different payoff functions, non-iid (and possibly incorrect) beliefs, different discount factors and large economies.
Existence of the Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices and, for each trader, a consumption plan that is affordable, preference maximal on the budget set and mutually feasible.
Depending on the cardinality of the set of traders, counted in terms of different beliefs, an economy can be either small or large. The methodology and the assumptions needed to prove existence of the competitive equilibrium in small economies and large economies are different. In this Section, I formally define the two settings and provide sufficient assumptions for existence of the equilibrium.
Existence of the equilibrium in small economies
Definition 3. An economy is small if the union of traders' beliefs, P = i∈I p i , has finitely many elements.
This standard set of assumptions ensure existence and uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium in small economies (see Peleg-Yaari (1970) ):
• A1: The payoff functions u i : R + → [−∞, +∞] are C 1 , concave and strictly increasing and satisfy the Inada condition at 0; that is, u i (c) → ∞ as c 0.
• A2: There are numbers 0 < f ≤ F < +∞ such that for each trader i, all dates t and all paths σ, f ≤ inf σ t i∈I e i t (σ) ≤ sup σ t i∈I e i t (σ) ≤ F .
• A3: For all traders i, all dates t and all paths σ,
Assumption A1 is a collection of standard properties that the payoff functions must satisfy. The Inada condition at 0 ensures that equilibrium prices are uniquely identified.
Assumption A2 uniformly bounds the aggregate endowment above and away from 0.
Assumption A3 is needed to exclude pathological economies in which the equilibrium does not exist (for example economies in which some traders attach 0 probability to an event that occurs with positive probability).
Unlike Sandroni (2000) and Blume-Easley (2006) , my approach does not require that the beliefs of the traders and the true probabilities are bounded away from 0. The reason is that my approach does not rely on approximate measures of distance to discuss the accuracy of traders' beliefs. My result gives a positive answer to the question raised by Sandroni (2000) about the possibility to dispose of that assumption.
Existence of the Equilibrium in Large Economies
Definition 4. An economy is large if the measure space of agents' beliefs is (A, A, λ)
where A is the unit interval, A the Borel subsets of A, and λ is the Lebesgue measure.
Following Ostroy's (1984) approach, a large economy is a pair ( , W 0 )) where describes preferences and W 0 defines an initial allocation of commodities to a group of traders. To ensure the existence of the equilibrium in large economies, my strategy is to integrate A1-A3 with a set of assumptions that allows me to use Ostroy's (1984) existence theorem. Ostroy's (1984) theorem requires three sets of assumptions: on the commodity space (Y.1), on the aggregate preferences (S.1-S.7) and on the initial allocation of commodities (T.1-T.2). A sufficient condition for Y.1 is the following 3 :
• A4: The beliefs of each trader are exchangeable (i.e., by De Finetti's Theorem, either iid or a (Bayesian) mixture of iid probabilities, see Section 5.4).
Assumptions S1-S7 are regularity assumptions on preferences. They are implied by A1 by letting be originated from the individualistic representation (u i , w 0 (i)).
Assumptions, T 1-T 2 are regularity conditions on the initial allocation. They are satisfied by assuming that the initial allocations are described by a Lebesque measurable function that integrates to 1. This function represents the initial equilibrium wealth-shares i.e. the inverse of the risk adjusted Pareto weight and can be interpreted, in both small and large economies , as a prior distribution on the set of beliefs.
• W.1: The market's prior distribution is a function w 0 (i):
3 Assumption Y.1 requires that the commodity space has an "order compatible" basis. This assumption is satisfied if the commodity space contains only countably many elements.
Claim: A4 implies Y.1: if all traders have exchangeable beliefs, they can only distinguish consumption on the basis of the average number of realizations and the length of the sequence. The elements of this set can be described with words of length 3 (the length of the sequence, the number of favorable outcomes, the division symbol) from a countable alphabet (N ∪ /) hence, by "the principle of countability" (Kantrowitz (2000) ) this set contains countably many elements.
The integral has to be interpreted in the Lebesgue sense. For small economies, θ(i) is the counting measure on I. For large economies, θ(i) is the Lebesgue measure on I and w 0 (i) is assumed to be 3 times differentiable.
Main Results
This section is divided in two subsections: (1) a technical section that characterizes equilibrium prices; and (2) a section to discuss survival.
Equilibrium Prices
For log-economies with homogeneous discount factors, the same argument used in the leading example shows that an exact equivalence between discounted prices and Bayesian updating from the market prior holds in every path and independently of the beliefs of the traders and of the size of the economy. The generalization of this result to different risk attitudes is complicated for two reasons. First, even for the iid case, discounted prices are not probabilities (Jouini-Napp (2006) , Cvitanic-Jouini-MalamudNapp (2012)). Second, risk attitudes have an effect wealth-shares' convergence rate (Blume-Easley (2006) ).
Theorem 1 characterizes equilibrium prices in small economies, it shows that risk attitudes have no asymptotic effect on equilibrium prices. If a unique equilibrium exists, equilibrium prices are asymptotically equivalent to a convex combination of discounted beliefs, in every path.
Theorem 1. In a small economy that satisfies A1-A3, ∀σ ∈ Σ :
Where captures the notion of two functions that converge to 0 at the same rate 4 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Definition: Given two functions f (x) and g(x), f (x) g(x) if and only if ∃0 < a ≤ā
Even under stronger assumptions on traders' risk attitudes, this intuitive result is not true for large economies. Theorem 2 shows that in a large economy prices can fail to be asymptotically equivalent to discounted probabilities, hence are not equivalent to a convex combination of traders' discounted beliefs. Theorem 2. In a large-iCRRA-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy that satisfies A1-A4-W.1, in which all traders have iid beliefs such that the union of traders' beliefs, P = i∈I p i , covers a non-empty open strict subset of the S-dimensional simplex, ∀σ ∈ Σ:
Where pî (σ t ) is the beliefs in P with the highest likelihood on σ t .
Moreover, if P is iid, then pî (σ t ) → P -a.s. P.
Proof. See Appendix B.
W.1 together with the assumptions on P make prices "comparable" (for log-economies they coincide) to the discounted probabilities of a Bayesian with smooth prior on a nonempty open strict subset of the simplex. Theorem 2 shows that equilibrium prices are asymptotically approximated by a modification of the BIC in which the dimensionality of the parameter space is also multiplied by the IES parameter, γ. Therefore, it shows that for γ = 1 prices are not discounted probabilities. Consistently with Theorem 1, if the economy has finitely many traders the space of beliefs has 0 Lebesgue measure, the ln t terms disappear and risk attitudes have no effect on survival.
The asymptotic difference between small and large economies can be understood as follows. Given a set of beliefs, by standard economic argument, the effect of risk attitudes on next period equilibrium prices is stronger when the traders have similar wealth-shares. In these models the selection argument implies that the wealth-share of the trader with the most accurate beliefs converges to one, hence the effect of risk attitudes on next period equilibrium prices converges to 0. The convergence rate of the wealth-shares depends on the number of traders in the economy: in a small economy the convergence rate is exponential (because is the same as the convergence of a Bayesian estimator), which is fast enough to identify a unique survivor. In large economies, the convergence rate is slower, for every t there is a positive mass of traders (
around the maximum likelihood probability with positive wealth-shares, hence we have asymptotic heterogeneity and risk attitudes have an asymptotic effect on equilibrium prices.
Proposition 1 illustrates the small sample effects of risk attitudes on wealth-shares and equilibrium prices.
Proposition 1. Given two iCRRA-homogeneous-discount-factor-economies that satisfy A1-A3(A4-W.1 if large), that only differ in the γ parameters, ∀t, ∀σ ∈ Σ :
where w(î(σ t )) is the wealth share of the agent with maximal likelihood on σ t .
The first two lines show that there is a negative relation between the value of γ and the price level. The economic intuition is as follows. Each trader subjectively believes that equilibrium prices are incorrect, hence the no trade theorems do not apply and each trader subjectively believes that investing in the market is profitable.
Depending on the risk attitudes, the substitution effect or the income effect can be predominant. If the substitution effect dominates, γ ∈ (0, 1), the traders invest more in future consumption and the price level rise. If the income effect dominates, γ > 1, traders increase current consumption and the price of future consumption drops. As usual, if γ = 1 (log) the two effects exactly offset each other. The last line shows that the value of γ is also inversely related to the wealth-share of the trader with beliefs of maximal likelihood. The reason is that a lower γ implies more aggressive investment strategies, hence faster wealth-share movements.
Wealth-shares
My approach addresses the problem of wealth-share convergence via a direct comparison between discounted beliefs and equilibrium prices. I will start by presenting a general necessary and sufficient condition to vanish, maintaining an implicit characterization of equilibrium prices. Specific applications are presented in the Sections that follows.
Theorem 3. In an economy that satisfies A1-A3-(A4-W.1 if large), 
Small economies
In this Section, I use the characterization of prices of Theorem 1 to provide a tractable necessary and sufficient condition for a trader to vanish for small-homogenous-discountfactor-economies: Corollary 1. This condition shows that, even if equilibrium prices are an endogenous variable, the asymptotic fate of a trader can be studied using known results about consistency of the Bayesian procedure. Then, I present an example of an economy in which my condition identifies a trader who vanishes that could not be identified using the pairwise comparison approach.
Corollary 1. In a small, homogeneous-discount-factor-economy that satisfies A1-A3, i) a trader vanishes P -a.s. if and only if his beliefs are less accurate than the beliefs of a Bayesian whose prior support coincides with the market's prior support;
ii) a Bayesian trader whose prior attaches positive mass to the beliefs of every other trader survives in every path.
Proof. By Theorem 1 we can substitute a discounted Bayesian mixture model for equilibrium prices in the condition of Theorem 3.
Example:
Consider a log-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy with two states S = {a, b} with iid true probabilities P = [ 
, if ties occur.
Trader 3 vanishes P-a.s.:
Proof. Lemma 5, Appendix C
The intuition goes as follows: trader 3 changes his opinion every time the trader that performed best in the past changes and uses 1 2 when trader 1 and trader 2 perform equally well. In this example, trader 1 and trader 2 are equally wrong hence the event t * = {p 1 (σ t * ) = p 2 (σ t * )} occurs infinitely often. The result follows, noticing that, by construction, trader 3 is always using the"wrong" model to predict the realizations at t * p 3 (σ t * |σ t * −1 ) = 1 3 , and verifying that the gains he gets by using the correct probabilities ( 1 2 ) in every t * +1 period are not enough to compensate for these losses. Pairwise comparison does not imply that trader 3 vanishes:
Proof. Lemma 6, Appendix C
The intuition goes as follows: WLOG consider the comparison between trader 3 and trader 1. We still have that trader 3's forecasts lose ground every time there is a change in the best model. Nevertheless, in the deviations from the empirical average that favor trader 2, trader 3 is doing better than trader 1. The result follows verifying that the gains in these deviations are infinitely often superior than the cumulated losses due to the fact that trader 3 changes his opinion infinitely often.
The comparison of the two results shows that the reason why trader 3 vanishes is that he cannot win against both trader 1 and 2 simultaneously: the deviations from the empirical average that favor trader 3 against trader 1 are the ones in which trader 3 performs poorly against trader 2 and vice versa.
Remark: In order to give the standard approach as much credit as possible, the proof of the result is done in terms of likelihood, not using the approximation of the likelihood adopted for Sandroni's or Blume-Easley's sufficient condition to vanish. It is easy to verify that no trader satisfies Sandroni's condition for a trader to vanish and that Blume-Easley's sufficient condition for a trader to to vanish would incorrectly indicate that trader 3 is the only survivor 5 .
5 According to Blume-Easley's notion of accuracy, Trader 3's next period forecasts are infinitely often more accurate than trader 1's and trader 2's forecasts and never less accurate.
Large Economies
In large economies, risk attitudes have a persistent effect on equilibrium prices. The following proposition capture the implications of this effect.
Proposition 2. In a large-iCRRA-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy that satisfies A1-A4-W.1 populated by positive mass of traders with iid beliefs that cover the simplex and by a positive mass of Bayesian traders (B) with a smooth prior on the simplex, the asymptotic wealth-share of traders B depends on the IES parameter as follows:
ii) γ = 1 ⇔ traders B survives and his wealth-share is less than 1, ∀σ ∈ Σ;
iii) γ > 1 ⇔ traders B is the only survivor, ∀σ ∈ Σ.
Proof.
See Appendix B.
The result follows because equilibrium prices are not asymptotic equivalent to discounted probabilities. By standard calculation, equilibrium prices are a convex combination of the discounted risk adjusted beliefs of the Bayesian traders (that follows the BIC) and the discounted risk adjusted beliefs of the iid traders (approximated By Theorem 2). If γ < 1(> 1) the iid (BIC) component of equilibrium prices converges to 0 slower than the BIC (iid) component. Therefore
q(σ t ) → 0(1), and the result follows from my necessary and sufficient condition for a trader to vanish.
The results of Proposition 2 hold in every path, hence its implications on the role of belief accuracy in the MSH depends on the assumptions we make about the data generating process. If P is iid, the result can be interpreted as a result about the effect of different risk attitudes on the survival of traders that learn the truth in a Bayesian way. If P is exchangeable (see Section 5.4), the result tells us that the MSH can fail in large economies. If the truth is not iid or exchangeable, the result is about universal properties of the selection mechanism.
Exchangeable large Economies
In this Section, I introduce the notion of exchangeable probabilistic models and De Finetti's Theorem to illustrate that, in a large economy, the MSH can fail: a group of traders with rational expectations can vanish.
A probability distribution P on Σ t is exchangeable if the distribution of the sequence σ t is invariant under any permutation of the indexes. Formally, Definition 6. A probability distribution P on Σ t is exchangeable if P (E) = P σ 1 , ..., σ t : σ π(1) , ..., σ π(t) ∈ E for every measurable set E ∈ Σ t and any permutation π of the indices.
A probability distribution P on Σ is exchangeable if the distribution of the sequence σ ∞ is invariant under any permutation of a finite number of indexes. Formally, Definition 7. A probability distribution P on Σ is exchangeable if the marginal distribution p(σ t ) ∈ Σ t (defined by P (E) = P (σ 1 , ...) ∈ Σ : σ π(1) , ..., σ π(t) ∈ E for every measurable set E ∈ Σ t ) is exchangeable for each t = 1, 2, ... It follows from the definition that, every sequence of iid random variables, conditional on some underlying distributional form, is exchangeable. De Finetti's Theorem ensures that the converse statement is also true for infinite sequences and that every infinite exchangeable sequence can be characterized as a mixture of iid sequences.
De Finetti's Theorem. A probability distribution P on Σ is exchangeable if and only if P is a mixture of iid distributions (Q):
for some probability distribution µ on the space of all probability distributions on S. The following example illustrates the result:
Example Consider a large-iCRRA-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy with two states S = {W, R}, populated by a group of traders with iid beliefs that cover the simplex and by a group of Bayesian traders (B) with a Uniform prior on the simplex.
The true probability is given by the following Polya urn process: the initial composition of the urn is one White ball (W) and one Red ball (R). At each discrete time (trial), we randomly select a ball from the urn and then return the ball to the urn along with one new ball of the same color. Clearly, the composition of the urn is changing in every period as a function of the last realized color. For example, if the first ball is R, then the composition of the urn for the second extraction is 2 R and 1 W: P (R|R) = 2 3 . If the second ball is again R, then the composition of the urn before the third extraction is 3 R and 1 W: P (R|R, R) = Iteratively: P (R t+1 |σ t ) =
Note that the Bayesian traders have rational expectations: by standard calculations, the forecasts of the Bayesian traders p B (R t+1 |σ t ) coincides in every sequence with the real composition of the urn (∀σ t , p B (R t+1 |σ t ) ≡ P (R t+1 |σ t )). Nevertheless, by Proposition 2, if the economy is iCRRA with γ < 1 the group of Bayesian traders vanish in every path 6 .
Remark: the iid case and the exchangeable case are related in the following way.
In the iid case, the true parameter P is fixed and the Bayesian posterior converges to it; in the exchangeable case, it is the true probability that moves and converges to an asymptotic frequencyp(σ), which is a random variable. If P =p(σ) these two dynamics produce equivalent likelihoods and the difference between a trader that learns and a trader with rational expectation is statistically lost. Therefore, even if irrational noise traders can drive traders with rational expectations out of the market, equilibrium prices still converge (weekly merge) to rational expectations and the traders that dominate have a model that is asymptotically as good as the correct one.
From Proposition 2 it follows that also the "opposite" case is possible. If the true probability is iid and the traders in the economy are more risk averse than log the 6 To convince ourself of this result, we can directly calculate the likelihood attached by the true model to every sequence of realizations and verify its consistency with the BIC approximation. Let σ t be a sequence generated by the described Polya urn process. Assume WLOG that p is the realized frequency of the R
realizations. I have to verify the following claim:
Claim: The true probability attached to σ t is approximated by the BIC:
b) By Sterling's approximation and disregarding finite constants.
Bayesian traders dominate even if they do not have rational expectations and there is a trader with rational expectations (but infinitesimal wealth-share). The intuition of the previous Remark also applies to this case.
Linear economies
Another way to identify the effect of risk attitudes on survival is to focus on the limiting case of a linear economy 7 . My approach allows for a simple characterization of the Proposition 4.
• i) In a small-linear-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy that satisfies A2-A3
and that contains a trader with rational expectations and a Bayesian whose prior attaches positive weight to the true model, the Bayesian trader vanishes P -a.s.;
• ii) In a linear-large-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy in which P is iid, populated by a positive mass of traders with iid beliefs that cover the simplex and a positive mass of traders with rational expectations, the asymptotic fate of the traders with rational expectations depends on the number of states as follows: if |S| ≤ 3, the trader with rational expectations vanishes in probability ; if |S| ≤ 3 he vanishes P -a.s.. Large economy: by risk neutrality, discounted market prices coincide, on every path, with the probability that corresponds to the model with the maximal likelihood on that path (By Theorem 2, with γ = 0). The result follows noticing that: a) γ → 0 implies that even infinitesimal differences in the likelihood are "lethal" for a trader.
b) The true model coincides with the model with maximal empirical likelihood only when the empirical frequency is exactly equal to the theoretical frequency.
c) This event is recursive if |S| ≤ 3 and transient otherwise (see Blume-Easley (2009) ).
Conclusion
This paper continues the project started by Sandroni (2000) and Blume-Easley (1992 ) on market selection. Unlike existing approaches, I focus on the role played by equilibrium prices in the selection mechanism and study the selection mechanism in both the small and large economy setting. I show that these settings are qualitatively different. In small economies, equilibrium prices are asymptotically equivalent to a convex combination of traders' discounted beliefs. Therefore, if all traders have the same discount factor, equilibrium prices are asymptotically equivalent to the discounted probability obtained via Bayes' rule from the market prior. The same result is not true for large economies: in a large economy, that is not log, prices are not asymptotically convex combinations of discounted traders' beliefs. My characterization of equilibrium prices is used to derive a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient for a trader to vanish. I show, by means of an example, that even for the simple case of a small homogeneous discount factor economy, the existing approach cannot deliver a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient for a trader to vanish. For large economies, as a consequence of the effect of risk attitudes on asymptotic equilibrium prices, the MSH can fail. A group of traders with rational expectations can lose all their wealth even if there is no other trader with rational expectations. Sufficient conditions for this result to occur are a large economy setting and an exchangeable data generating process. For these cases, I show that the selection argument still supports a version of convergence to rational expectations.
A Appendix
Lemma 1. In a small economy that satisfies A1-A3: ∃a, b ∈ (0, ∞) : ∀t, ∀σ ∈ Σ :
Proof. i) i∈I
∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀i ∈ I, u i (c i t (σ)) > 0 because the total endowment is finite (A2) and the payoff functions are monotone and strictly concave with positive derivative at 0 (A1).
= 0 ⇔ ∀i ∈ I, u i (c i t (σ) = ∞ which is true iif all the traders have 0 consumption and satisfy the Inada condition at 0. The first requirements is impossible as it violates the market clearing condition: i∈I c i t = i∈I e i t > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By the FOCs: ∀t, ∀σ ∈ Σ,
= β t u i (c t ); rearranging and summing over traders: q(σ t ) =
; by Lemma 1 ∃a, b ∈ R : ∀t, ∀σ ∈ Σ,
Lemma 2. In a homogeneous-discount-factors, small-iCRRA-economy with constant aggregate endowment and that satisfies A3:
Proof. Standard calculations
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For small economies, integrals have to be understood in the Lebesgue sense.
« γ . For γ ≤ 1, the result is an implication of the Minkowsky 's inequality for integrals (Folland (1999) pg. 194 ): let r = 1 γ ≥ 1, then,
For γ > 1, r < 1, hence the quantities of interests are not norms (fail to satisfy the triangular inequality). The result follows from a "reversed" Minkowsky's inequality for integrals. The inequality is obtained by plugging the "reversed" Hölder's Inequality in the proof of Minkowski's inequality for integrals, Folland (1999), pg. 194 .
ii) The result follows from proposition 6.12 pg 186, Folland (1999) that states:
The result apply to this setting as follows:
By Equation 2, P (X) = I w i 0 = 1 and
iii) By the FOC and Equation 2, the wealth share of traderî(σ t ) on σ t is given by
and the result follows because:
a) : ∀j =î(σ t ) and t long enough,
< 1 by construction with equality if
we have multiple models with maximal likelihood.
If trader i has infinitesimal initial wealth-share, the result follows since 0 ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. i) By the FOC:
. Therefore, ∀σ ∈ Σ, lim sup
a : By A1 lim c→0 u i (c) = +∞ and the payoff functions are strictly concave, increasing.
ii) Convergence in expectation implies convergence in probability.
iii) The result follows because lim sup
is a constant.
B Appendix
In this appendix I make use of the notation O(.) and o(.) with the following meanings.
Using Lemma 2 and letting the number of traders go to infinity we obtain the following equation for the equilibrium prices in a large-iCRRA-homogeneous-discountfactor-economy:
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First point:
satisfies the regularity condition needed for Lemma 4. Second point: if the data generating process is P , then P -a.s. pî (σt|σ t−1 ) → P -a.s. P (σ t |σ t−1 ).
The proof of Lemmas 3 and 4 rely on a modification of the proofs of the BIC approximation in Grünwald (2007) . The only difference between my proof and Grünwald's (2007) proof (pg. 248 ) is the introduction of the γ parameter. In a log economy, γ = 1 they coincide.
Lemma 3. Let M be an exponential family of distributions parametrized by I. Let σ t be any sequence with pî (σ) ∈ I and let w be an arbitrary prior distribution. Then:
Proof. I focus on the case k = 1, which is to say on the Bernoulli family: S = {a, b}, the generalization to the multinomial family is straightforward.
The result follows because, in every sequence:
Lemma 4. Let M be an exponential family parametrized by I (in the canonical parametrization of distributions). Let I 0 non-empty open strict subset of I. Let σ t be any sequence with pî (σ) ∈ I 0 and let w be a prior distribution on I which is continuous and strictly positive on I 0 . Then
Where I(pî (σ t ) ) is the Fisher information evaluated at pî (σ t ) .
Proof. By Lemma 3 γ ln
To proof the claim I will approximate the integral using a second order Taylor series expansion and proving that the expansion does not lose relevant information.
Since w(i) is continuous on I and strictly positive atî there is a T , such that ∀t > T
In what follows I always assume t > T .
Note that:
I need to bound the two integrals:
Remember that D(pî (σ t ) ||p i ) as a function of p i is strictly convex and has a minimum
Therefore, since I(p i ) is continuous and > 0 and also I\Bt w(i)dθ(i) < ∞.
For some c > 0, k < ∞.
. Putting all together:
Since w and I are continuous functions over a compact set (I 0 ), the convergence is uniform.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let w B 0 = w b 0 dθ(i) and c B be the aggregate initial wealth-shares and consumption of the Bayesian traders; Assume WLOG that all traders have the same smooth prior g(θ). By the FOC:
By the FOCs:
My goal is to have a P -a.s. approximation of the likelihood of p 3 and q. It is convenient to express the sequence of realizations as a Random Walk:
, and S t = t τ =1 y τ .
The beliefs of trader 3 can be equivalently expressed as:
In the Lemmas that follows I refer to two RVs: n(t) the number of times the RW crosses 0 before t; |S t | the absolute distance of the random walk from 0 at t.
Lemma 5.
Using the characterization of the likelihoods of trader 3 and q of Lemma 7 and 8: 
a) Because n(t) → P -a.s. ∞, (known result about local times, see also Massari (2012) ).
Lemma 6.
Proof. WLOG, let focus on lim sup
. Trader's 3 likelihood is obtained in Lemma 7; trader's 1 likelihood is given by:
Since we are focusing on the lim sup of the likelihood ratio we can assume WLOG that S t > 0, which is the least favorable deviation for trader 1. (2) |St| 3 4 = +∞ P -a.s.
The last convergence holds because, by Lemma 9, lim sup |S t | − n(t) = P -a.s. ∞.
Lemma 7. The likelihood attached by trader 3 to a generic finite sequence of realization σ t is given by:
Proof. I need to be able to characterize the probability that p 3 attaches to generic paths. Since p 3 is path dependent, I will characterize its value as a function of characteristics that occurs in every path in a set of measure 1. My proof show that, given t, p 3 (σ t ) depends crucially on the values of two RVs, n(t) the number of times the RW crosses 0 before t; and |S t | the absolute distance of the random walk from 0 at t. Given an arbitrarily long path σ t , define, ex post, the following sequence of crossing times: {T 1 := min t {t > 0 : S t = 0}, ..., T n := min t {t > T n−1 : S t = 0}, ...}. , since the crossing occurs p 3 is using the "worst" model; on the deviation after the last crossing |S|-1, p 3 = 2 3 because p 3 is using the "best" model on the deviation; in the remaining periods, p 3 is half of the time using the best model, (
) and half of the time not using the best model Claim 1: For each n ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}, the likelihood that trader 3 attach to the sequence of realizations between T n + 1 and T (n+1) is given by:
Proof. There are 3 terms to be explained:
• The 1 2 term is the likelihood attached by trader 3 to the first realization after a crossing (T n + 1): S Tn = 0 ⇒ p 3 (σ Tn+1 |σ Tn ) = 1 2 .
• The 2 3 1 3
term is the likelihood attached by trader 3 to the realizations in the interval T n + 2, ..., T (n+1) − 1 . This term follows from these observations:
-i) the strategy of trader 3 is fixed ∀τ ∈ T n + 2, ..., T (n+1) and it is either
depending on the realization at T n + 1. Proof: Since no crossing occurs between T n and T (n+1) , ∀τ ∈ T n + 2, ..., T (n+1) :
-ii) In the interval T n + 2, ..., T (n+1) − 1 , the number of a's realizations equals the numbers of b's realizations. Proof:
Since T (n+1) is the first crossing after T n , it must be that: y Tn+1 = −y T (n+1) , otherwise the crossing at T (n+1) would not occur. Proof:
term is the likelihood attached by trader 3 to the realization that causes the crossing (σ T (n+1) ). Proof:
otherwise the crossing can not occur.
Lemma 8. The likelihood attached by q to a generic finite path σ t is larger than:
lim sup |S t | − n(t) = +∞ P -a.s.
Proof. Define the RV z t = y t (sign(S t−1 )), with sign(
−1 if x < 0 By the discrete time version of Tanaka formula (directly proven in Lemma 10):
Since, z t are iid RVs with E(z t )=0 and V ar(z t )=1. By the Law of Iterated Logarithms (Williamas (1991)): lim sup
Proof. The proof that follows requires a series of intermediate claims:
. Proof: Note that sign (S T N ) = 1 and that t τ =T N +2 y τ sign (S t−1 ) = t τ =T N +2 y τ , because there are no crossing after T N . It follows that:
Divide the crossing time into two sets:
Claim 2: n ∈ T + => Tn t=T (n−1) +1 z t = 0. Proof: Note that n ∈ T + ⇒ ∀τ ∈ T (n−1) , ..., T n , sign(S τ ) = 1, therefore:
Note that sign(S T (n−1) ) = +1 and n ∈ T − ⇒ ∀τ ∈ T (n−1) + 1, ..., , T n − 1 , sign(S τ ) = −1, therefore:
By Claim 1,2,3:
The last P -a.s. equality is an implication of the Strong Law of Large Number: y Tn is negative half of the times.
D Appendix
In this section I discuss the similarities and differences between the small and large framework. There are two discontinuities between large and small economies: a statistical discontinuity and the discontinuity due to effect risk attitudes on equilibrium prices. These discontinuity are qualitatively different. The statistical discontinuity only appears at infinitum, hence it does not affect the significance of my analysis on arbitrarily long, but finite sequences. Moreover, it disappears if we chose an appropriate way to construct the limit economy; the discontinuity due to the effect of risk attitudes follows from the dichotomic definition of survival, not from a discontinuous change in the dynamic of wealth-shares. Let start with the statistical discontinuity.
The results of the previous sections, implies:
Corollary 2. In a iCRRA-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy that satisfies A1-A3 (A4-W.1 if large). If the the data generating process is iid and the economy contain positive mass of Bayesian trader(s) B and a positive mass of traders with heterogenous iid beliefs.
• Case 1] If trader B has smooth prior on a set of positive Lebesgue measure and there is a trader with rational expectations and positive initial wealth-share, trader B vanishes.
• Case 1'] If the prior of trader B attaches positive mass to the true model and there is a continuum of iid traders whose beliefs cover the simplex, trader B is the only survivor.
• Case 2] If trader B has smooth prior on a set of positive Lebesgue measure and no trader has rational expectations, trader B is the only survivor.
• Case 2'] If trader B's prior attaches 0 probability to a neighborhood of P with positive Lebesgue measure and there is a continuum of iid traders whose beliefs cover the simplex, trader B vanishes.
• Case 3] If the prior of trader B attaches positive mass to P and there is a trader with rational expectation and positive wealth-share, the wealth-share of trader B is bounded away from 0 and 1.
• Case 3'] If trader B has smooth prior on a set of positive Lebesgue measure and there is a continuum of iid traders whose beliefs cover the simplex, the wealthshare of trader B is bounded away from 0 and 1 if and only if the economy is log. (for a precise discussion, a good reference is Balasubramanian (1997) ). Since the aim of my analysis is to describe the wealth-share evolution of markets populated by some sophisticated traders, the Bayesian, and some more naive traders, the iid group, on arbitrarily long but finite sequences (real markets) focusing on Case 3' is done WLOG.
For non log economies, Proposition 2 describes how the result of Case 3' changes.
The next Proposition shows that the discontinuity in the effect of risk attitude on survival is only apparent and depends on the dychotomic nature of the notion of survival.
Proposition 5. In a small-iCRRA-homogeneous-discount-factor-economy that satisfies A1-A3, in which there is a trader with rational expectations,î, and a Bayesian trader, B, whose prior attaches positive probability to the true model (ĝ), then c B (σ t ) → P -a.s. 
